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INTRODUCTION
Eighteen U.S. states and India, as well as at least forty other coun-
tries, have no legislation or case law that permits, prohibits, or regulates
surrogacy. 1 This regulatory lacuna typically exists because of a failure to
reach a consensus on legislation or sheer neglect of the issue. In jurisdic-
tions where there is no regulation, a free market model prevails. Intended
parents and surrogates negotiate contract terms based on their relative
bargaining power and there are no statutes or common law that specifi-
cally address surrogacy in those jurisdictions.
In those eighteen U.S. states where state legislatures have not man-
dated certain protections for surrogates, the surrogacy industry has devel-
oped strong baseline protections for women who sell gestational care on
its own accord. For example, industry norms require that intended par-
* I would like to thank everyone who participated in the Tel-Aviv University-Cornell
colloquium in October 2017 in Ithaca, N.Y. for their comments. I am indebted to Bob Hillman,
Eduardo Penalver, Bradley Wendel, Cynthia Bowman, and Bruce Hale for their close reading
and insightful comments. I am grateful to Brad Lenox for his prompt and careful assistance
with this Article.
1 Sital Kalantry et al., Should Compensated Surrogacy Be Permitted or Prohibited? Pol-
icy Report Evaluating the New York Child-Parent Security Act of 2017 that Would Permit
Enforceable and Compensated Surrogacy, available at: https://cpb-us-el.wpmucdn.com/blogs
.cornell.edu/dist/2/7529/files/2017/05/Cornell-Report-273uhyk.pdf.
686 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 27:685
ents pay for legal representation for surrogates, life insurance, and health
insurance (unless the surrogate has her own health coverage). Like in the
eighteen U.S. states, there is no regulation or protections imposed by
legislation for surrogates in India. However, unlike in the United States,
the Indian surrogacy industry has not provided similar basic protections
for surrogates.
Both India and the United States are common law countries tracing
their roots to British colonialism. Eighteen states in the United States and
all of India lacks any legislation or common law specifically addressing
surrogacy. Through a comparative study of gestational care markets in
India and several of the eighteen U.S. states with unregulated surrogacy
markets, I try to understand why the surrogacy industry in the United
States has developed contract norms that are more protective of the sur-
rogate than the surrogacy industry in India. This Article draws on inter-
views with lawyers, fertility specialists, surrogates, agents, and other
actors involved in gestational care markets in India and the United
States. 2 I argue that one of the main reasons that customary industry
norms are more surrogate-protective in the United States than in India is
because the shadow of the common law is darker and wider in the United
States than in India.
In an important article, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, Professors Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhausert
pointed out that even when parties negotiate divorce settlements outside
of court, the outcome that the common law impacts the negotiations of
the parties.3 While Mnookin and Kornhausert's article focused on negoti-
ations around dissolving contracts (namely, marriages), I extend their
ideas to the contract formation stage. Their article was groundbreaking
2 Eight Cornell Law students, Professor Bradley Wendel, and I travelled to New Delhi,
India to (among other things) interview surrogates to understand their views on whether com-
pensated surrogacy should be legal. We were working in collaboration with Professors Aparna
Chandra and Mrinal Satish and eight students at the National Law University in Delhi. As part
of the fieldwork, teams of four students visited medical clinics and interviewed doctors and
surrogates, and also visited surrogacy homes. In total, we conducted nine semi-structured in-
terviews of surrogates in New Delhi and Anand, Gujarat; each interview lasted approximately
one hour. It should be noted that the surrogates we spoke to were referred to us by fertility and
surrogacy medical professionals, and some interviews took place in surrogacy homes. Thus,
there is likely sample bias. Nor are the interviews representative of all surrogates. In the
United States, four students interviewed nine surrogacy lawyers in different American states.
The interviews cited here were conducted by students supervised by an instructor, and other
students took notes at the interview and all interviewees reviewed and revised the notes after
the interview. Additionally, the questions for the interviews were developed in advance by the
instructors and students. Cornell Law School, In "Global Classroom," Students Study Surro-
gacy Law and Policy in India and the United States, May 1, 2017, http://www.law-
school.cornell.edu/spotlights/In-Global-Classroom-Students-Study-Surrogacy-Law-and-
Policy-in-India-and-the-United-States.cfm.
3 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
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because it observed the ways in which common law rules created by
family courts influenced the negotiation positions and the substantive
terms agreed to by the divorcing parties.
The comparative study of the legal regimes in India and the United
States further contributes to the shadow of the law theory by suggesting
that a prerequisite condition is necessary for the common law to create a
shadow under which private parties bargain fairly. For common law rules
to create a legal shadow or to inform private bargaining, courts must be
both accessible to injured parties and the timeframe for adjudication of
cases must be reasonably fast.
Industry actors in the United States negotiate surrogacy contracts
within the "shadow of the law" while industry actors in India do not do
so to the same extent. This occurs because American courts are more
accessible to American surrogates than Indian courts are to Indian surro-
gates. Judgments are also generally rendered faster by courts in the
United States than in India. On the other hand, in India, due to laws
prohibiting contingent fees (among other things), there is limited access
to courts for the poor women who become surrogates and the lengthy
timeframe for adjudication makes court decisions less meaningful. It is
for this and other reasons that the common law does not cast as dark or
wide of a shadow over industry actors in India as it does in the United
States.
There are also other factors that one might think also influences the
development of more surrogate-protective norms in the United States and
not in India. The substance of the law, particularly tort law, may be less
favorable to plaintiffs in India as compared to similarly-situated plaintiffs
in the United States. In the United States there are well-publicized cases
where high tort awards have been granted to plaintiffs. Typically, Indian
courts do not award high punitive damages. However, even if Indian
courts awarded higher tort damages, that would still not constrain Indian
surrogacy industry actors since they are aware that surrogates generally
lack access to courts.
Another explanation for why the Indian surrogacy industry may not
offer the same level of surrogate-protective norms than the surrogacy
industry in the United States is the greater relative economic inequality,
between surrogates in India and intended parents in India, on the one
hand, and between surrogates and intended parents in the U.S., on the
other hand. Interestingly, poor women in the United States are excluded
from the gestational care markets by industry actors-many matching
agencies refuse to consider applications from women below the Federal
poverty line. This policy may itself be in response to the shadow of the
common law. Industry actors might worry that surrogacy contracts with
poor women are more likely to be invalidated by courts on grounds of
2018]
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duress or unconcionability. Thus, the fact that poor women are not al-
lowed to be surrogates in the United States is itself a consequence of the
strong shadow of the law created by common law rules in the United
States.
The findings of this Article have implications for surrogacy law and
policy in India as well as other emerging gestational care markets around
the world. Over the last decade transnational demand from same-sex
couples and infertile people fueled robust gestational care markets in In-
dia. Reports of unfair treatment of surrogates soon emerged. Witnessing
the abusive conditions faced by surrogates, Indian policymakers re-
sponded by banning transnational gestational care completely. In 2015,
the executive denied visas to foreigners seeking gestational care. One
year later, it proposed to prohibit women from receiving any compensa-
tion for providing gestational care. Similarly, Nepal, Thailand, Cambo-
dia, and Mexico 4 once had flourishing unregulated transnational
gestational care markets, but have moved to ban compensated surrogacy
rather than to legalize and regulate it.
Instead of prohibiting surrogacy completely, this Article suggests
another policy response to protect surrogates. In countries where the
common law does not cast a dark shadow (either because of its substance
or because of the lack of access to courts), the government should permit
but heavily regulate surrogacy by providing baseline levels of protections
to surrogates. I outline a menu of regulatory options that countries can
consider as they develop a regulatory framework based on their specific
circumstances.
Within the spectrum of contract law, jurisdictions can allow for full
freedom of contract or heavily regulate surrogacy contracts. In India,
surrogacy contracts seem most similar to consumer contracts. In con-
sumer contracts there is a problem with genuine consent, non-reading,
and there is a vulnerable party on one side of the transaction. The legisla-
tive framework of many countries and some states in the United States
already draw upon solutions proposed in consumer contract context with
India to address concerns about surrogacy contracts. I suggest that
4 See, e.g., Rachel Abrams, Nepal Bans Surrogacy, Leaving Couples With Few Low-
Cost Options, N.Y. TMrEs May 2, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/world/asia/ne-
pal-bans-surrogacy-leaving-couples-with-few-low-cost-options.html; National Health Policy
2071, pt. 12 cl. 14, 2014 (Nepal); Supreme Court of Nepal, Case 072-WO-01 19 (2016); New
Thai Surrogacy Law Bans Foreigners, SBS, Jul. 31, 2015, http://www.sbs.com.au/news/arti-
cle/2015/07/31/new-thai-surrogacy-law-bans-foreigners; Child Born Out of Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology Protection Act B.E. 2558 (Thai. 2015); Kuch Naren, Prime Minister
Warns Mothers Against Surrogacy in Midst of Ban, CAMBODIA DAniy, Feb. 22, 2017, https://
www.cambodiadaily.com/morenews/prime-minister-warns-mothers-against-surrogacy-in-
midst-of-ban-125583/; Eleonara Lamm, Mexico, in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY AGREE-
MENTs: LEGAL REGULATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 255, 255-56 (Katarina Trimmings
& Paul Beaumont eds. 2013).
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policymakers should more explicitly consider reforms proposed in the
consumer contract context to address inequalities in the surrogacy
contract.
I use the term "gestational care" to describe the services provided
by surrogates. On the other hand, anti-commodification opponents of
surrogacy use vocabulary that emphasizes a woman's body parts and
suggests that she lacks choice or agency. For example, commentators
refer to the services surrogates provide as renting their wombs, particu-
larly when speaking of women in the Global South.5
American surrogacy industry actors have also failed to develop a
more positive label for the services a woman provides. Some American
surrogacy contracts describe the payment received by the surrogate as
compensation for "pain and suffering."'6 While clearly there is pain and
suffering for many women during pregnancy and childbirth, the tort law
terminology does not adequately capture the role surrogates play. In-
tended parents are not paying to cause a surrogate "pain and suffering"-
rather they are paying for the nurturing she provides to the embryo and
fetus. The reason the tort term is used relates to taxes. In the United
States, damages for physical injuries are not taxed.7 Industry actors
might use this tort terminology to perpetuate the idea that the surrogate
should not have to pay taxes on the services she provides. Ultimately,
tax-free surrogacy benefits both intended parents and matching entities
since it allows them to pay surrogates less money. Thus, albeit for differ-
ent reasons, both actors that are opposed to surrogacy and those that
favor it, use terminology that devalues the surrogate and the work that
she does.
I propose a term, "gestational care," that imbues the surrogate with
more agency and recognizes the role she plays. I use the word "care" to
reflect the nurturing a surrogate provides to the embryo and fetus she
carries. I use the word "gestational" because in ninety-five percent of
surrogacy contracts in the United States (and probably more in India),
women engage in gestational surrogacy. They have no genetic connec-
5 See Sonia Allan, The Surrogate in Commercial Surrogacy: Legal and Ethical Consid-
erations, in SURROGACY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113, 122 (Paula Gerber & Katie O'Byrne
eds., 2015) (stating that women are seen as "empty vessels," "walking wombs," or "breed-
ers"); Interview with Hemu Sahu, in India (Apr. 7, 2017) (explaining that some doctors analo-
gize surrogacy to domestic work and question why we would describe surrogacy as "renting a
womb" when we do not describe domestic work as "renting a hand").
6 E.g. SAMPLE GS CONTRACT, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/sample-contracts/
GScontractl.htm (last visited Sep. 16, 2017).
7 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2015) ("[G]ross income does not include ... the amount of any
damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness").
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tion to the embryo. 8 Using in vitro fertilization, the eggs of the intended
mother are fertilized by the sperm of the intended father. In cases where
the intended parents are a same-sex couple and/or where one or both of
the intended parents is infertile, either the sperm or egg or both comes
from a third party, but usually not from the surrogate. Some U.S. states
permit only gestational surrogacy and explicitly prohibit genetic
surrogacy. 9
In Part I, I describe surrogacy law and policy as it currently stands
in India and the United States. I demonstrate that surrogates in unregu-
lated markets in the United States receive greater protections than surro-
gates in India where the market is also unregulated. In Part II, I ask what
accounts for the disparate industry norms in two legal environments that
both lack any legislation on surrogacy. I argue this occurs because indus-
try actors in the United States operate in the shadow of common law,
particularly contract and tort law, while industry actors in India do not
change their behavior in light of the common law rules. Where common
law casts a weak shadow or no shadow at all, policymakers should enact
regulations to protect surrogates rather than ban surrogacy. In Part III, I
examine the spectrum of contract law regulation and propose the con-
sumer contract regulatory framework as another option for countries like
India to consider when formulating legislation to regulate gestational
care markets.
I. INDIAN AND AMERICAN GESTATIONAL CARE MARKETS
AND REGULATION
In this section, I describe the regulatory environment and the indus-
try standards in regard to surrogates in the U.S. and India. Both India and
eighteen U.S. states have not enacted legislation or administrative rules
that protect surrogates or that provide any regulations on actors in the
industry. I demonstrate that in practice the industry norms and customary
8 Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, FAMn-Y ADvo-
CATE, Fall 2011, at 32, 33.
9 Kentucky prohibits traditional surrogacy but allows gestational surrogacy. See Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4); Louisiana prohibits traditional surrogacy and compensated
gestational surrogacy, but does not explicitly prohibit uncompensated gestational surrogacy.
See LA. STAT. ANN. 9:2719 (2016) (explicitly prohibiting traditional surrogacy); LA. STAT.
ANN. 9:2720(c) (2016) (explicitly prohibiting compensated surrogacy); Maine prohibits a wo-
man from entering into a gestational carrier agreement if she contributes gametes, unless she is
a family member of the intended parents but otherwise prohibits gestational surrogacy con-
tracts. See ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1931(E) (2016); New Jersey allows for uncompensated
gestational surrogacy. A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000);
In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 280 (N.J. 2012); Traditional surrogacy is still prohibited because
Baby M has never been overturned by case law or statute. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264
(N.J. 1988); North Dakota allows gestational surrogacy. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-08
(2005); However, it prohibits traditional surrogacy, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2005).
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contractual provisions that have developed in the United States are much
more protective of surrogates than those that have evolved in India.
A. Gestational Care Markets and Regulation India
The surrogacy market in India has flourished over the last few de-
cades. 10 Some estimates place the value of the Indian surrogacy market
at over two billion dollars.'1 Gay male couples and infertile heterosexual
couples flocked to India because their own countries prohibited surro-
gacy or because it was more cost-effective in India. India is an ideal host
country for surrogacy-it has state-of-the-art medical tourism facilities,
English-speaking medical professionals, and a relatively large supply of
poor women willing to provide gestational care. 12 Surrogates are often
women who do not speak English, live in slums, or are squatters. 13 In a
typical arrangement, both intended parents, if they are a fertile heterosex-
ual couple, are biologically related to the child. 14
Surrogacy activity in India occurs without any serious government
monitoring or regulation. In 2005, the Indian Council of Medical Re-
search (ICMR) issued guidelines on surrogacy. 15 The ICMR is a body,
funded by the Indian government, responsible for the formulation, coor-
dination, and promotion of biomedical research. 16 Many fertility clinics
today follow the ICMR guidelines, but they are neither binding nor ro-
bust. 17 Moreover, Witzleb and Chawla point out that the guidelines "lean
too much towards protecting the interests of ART providers and prospec-
tive parents, leaving surrogate mothers vulnerable and open to
exploitation."' 18
10 The first Indian child to be born as a result of IVF treatments was born in 1978; by
2005, there were about 250 IVF clinics in India. INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH &
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ACCREDITATION, SU-
PERVISION AND REGULATION OF ART CLINICS IN INDIA (2005), 4-5, http://icmr.nic.in/art/
art_clinics.htm [hereinafter ICMR GUIDELINES]; Commercial surrogacy was legalized in India
in 2002. Priya Shetty, India's Unregulated Surrogacy Industry, 380 LANCET 1633, 1633
(2012); There were approximately 3,000 JVF clinics by 2012. Nita Bhalla & Mansi Thapliyal,
Foreigners are Flocking to India to Rent Wombs and Grow Surrogate Babies, BusnmMss IN-
SIDER, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/india-surrogate-mother-industry-2013-
9.
11 Shetty, supra note 10, at 1633.
12 See Normann Witzleb & Anurag Chawla, Surrogacy in India: Strong Demand, Weak
Laws, in SURROGACY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167, 168 (Paula Gerber & Katie O'Byrne
eds., 2015).
13 See Centre for Social Research, Report of the National Conference on "A Police Dia-
logue on Issues around Surrogacy in India," 1, 14.
14 In some cases, there may be a sperm donor and/or egg donor.
15 Witzleb, supra note 12.
16 INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, http://www.icmr.nic.in/AboutUs/About_
ICMR.html (last visited on December 1, 2017).
17 See ICMR GUIDELINES, supra note 10.
18 Witzleb, supra note 12, at 175.
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The Indian government proposed legalizing and regulating surro-
gacy under three separate bills in 2008, 2010, and 2014, but none of them
passed. 19 In 2015, the Ministry of Home Affairs, in response to the In-
dian Supreme Court's order, started to deny foreigners visas for surro-
gacy purposes in November 2015. 20 The ban on transnational surrogacy
significantly reduced demand, but intended parents in India continued to
hire surrogates. 21
The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill of 2016 (the "2016 Bill") 22 was the
first legislation proposed to prohibit compensated surrogacy com-
pletely.23 On the other hand, uncompensated surrogacy (commonly re-
ferred to as "altruistic surrogacy"), in which the intended parents pay
only for costs such as medical expenses and insurance coverage would
be allowed under the 2016 Bill.24 Similarly, in Louisiana and Ne-
braska, 25 a surrogate who carries a child to term without compensation is
bound to relinquish custody of the child. But if that same surrogate were
19 The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill (India 2008), http://www.pr-
sindia.org/uploads/media/vikasdoc/docs/1241500084--DraftARTBill.pdf; The Assisted Re-
productive Technology (Regulation) Bill (India 2010), http://www.icmr.nic.in/guide/
ART%20REGULATION%20Draft%2OBilll.pdf; The Assisted Reproductive Technology
(Regulation) Bill (India 2014), www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/draft/Draft%20Assisted%20
Reproductive%20Technology%20(Regulation)%2OBill,%202014.pdf.
20 Circular No. 462, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (Nov. 3, 2015),
available at http://mhal.nic.in/pdfs/surrogacy031120l5.pdf; Hari G. Ramasubramanian, In-
dian Government Hurriedly Notifies Stopping of Surrogacy for Foreign Nationals, INDIAN
SURROGACY L. CENTRE (Oct. 28, 2015), http://blog.indiansurrogacylaw.com/indian-govern-
ment-hurriedly-notifies-stopping-of-surrogacy-for-foreign-national/ ; Previously, in January
2013, the Ministry of Home Affairs had prohibited foreign gay people and single people from
availing of medical and gestational care. However, Indian single individuals and gay couples
continue to be able to hire a surrogate. Madhavi Rajadhyakshal, No Surrogacy Visa for Gay
Foreigners, TvsMS OF INDIA, Jan. 18, 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-surro-
gacy-visa-for-gay-foreigners/articleshow/18066771.cms; Gay Bollywood film producer, Karan
Jorar, recently made headlines for having twins from a surrogate. Parenthood Through Surro-
gacy: Karan Johar Confirms Birth of Twins - Roohi and Yash, INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 6, 2017,
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/parenthood-through-surrogacy-karan-johar-confirms-
birth-of-twins-roohi-and-yash-4556163/.
21 See Interview with Dr. Gupta, Gupta Clinic (April 6, 2017) (New Delhi, India).
22 The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, No. 257 (India 2016), available at http://l64.100
.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/257_LS_2016_Eng.pdf.
23 Id. ch. VII, § 35.
24 Id. ch. III, § 4(ii)(b); id. ch. I, § 2(b).
25 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2720.13(B)(2) (2016) (a court, if necessary, shall "order[ ] that the
child be surrendered to the intended parents"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200(1) (1988) (bio-
logical father of children born from surrogacy sole legal parent of resulting child); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.26.260 (1989) ( ("If a child is born to a surrogate mother pursuant to a surrogate
parentage contract, and there is a dispute between the parties concerning custody of the child,
the party having physical custody of the child may retain physical custody of the child until the
superior court orders otherwise"); Michigan and New York also treat uncompensated surro-
gacy contracts differently than compensated surrogacy contracts. Both types of contracts are
not enforceable, but actors involved in compensated surrogacy arrangements can face further
criminal penalties. MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722.855-859 (1988); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122
(McKinney 2010).
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paid for her services, a court in those states will refuse to enforce the
contract.26 Why is a woman who donates gestational care bound to give
up the child, but a woman who is paid for it able to keep the child? This
model reinforces stereotypes that women should engage in domestic
work out of a sense of joy and generosity.2 7
A standing committee of the Indian Parliament recently lambasted
the 2016 Bill. They argued that compensated surrogacy, at least for In-
dian intended parents, should be regulated and legal.28 The Cornell Inter-
national Human Rights Clinic and the National Law University (Delhi)
submitted a report to the standing committee, parts of which the commit-
tee incorporated into its report. 29 It remains to be seen whether the exec-
utive or Parliament will propose a revised bill or move forward with the
existing bill to ban compensated surrogacy. In the meantime, with the
regulatory lacunae, the private contracting model still prevails.
Indian medical professionals play a more significant role in the sur-
rogacy process than their American counterparts. Many fertility special-
ists are involved in recruiting potential surrogates through agents and
brokers (who are also sometimes former surrogates). 30 Once the surro-
gate is identified, some fertility specialists even hire intermediaries to
manage homes in which pregnant surrogates are required to stay for a
few days after the embryo transfer and during the later term of the preg-
nancy. Surrogates are sometimes required to remain in these homes for
the duration of their pregnancies. In many of those residences, surrogates
are not allowed to leave except under special circumstances. The resi-
dence may be far from their children and families. Doctors claim that
requiring surrogates to live together in one place is the only way to en-
sure that women receive adequate nutrition, do not perform strenuous
26 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. 9:2720(C) (2016) (any contract for compensation "executed
in the state of Louisiana or any other state shall be absolutely null and unenforceable in the
state of Louisiana as contrary to public policy").
27 This legal model also rejects one of the key objections raised against surrogacy-that
women cannot predict in advance whether or not they will be able to part with a child they
give birth to. This also flies in the face of traditional contract law gift doctrine. This hybrid
model creates puzzling questions, but it persists (in part) because of the discomfort society
feels in placing a monetary value on gestational care.
28 Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha, Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Com-
mittee on Health and Family Welfare, One Hundred Second Report on The Surrogacy (Regu-
lation) Bill, 2016, available at https://kalantry.lawschool.comell.edu/files/2017/08/lndian-
Parliament-Report- 102- lqs7ole.pdf.
29 Sital Kalantry, Indian Parliament Standing Committee Incorporates Views of Cornell
International Human Rights Policy Advocacy Clinic, CORNELL L. SCH., https://kalantry.law
school.comell.edu/intemational-human-rights-policy-advocacy-clinic/past-projects-of-the-in-
ternational-human-rights-clinic/indian-parliament-standing-conimittee-incorporates-views-of-
comell-intemational-human-rights-policy-advocacy-clinic/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
30 See Abby Rabinowitz, The trouble with renting a womb, GuARIARN (Apr. 28, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/apr/28/paying-for-baby-trouble-with-renting-
womb-india.
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work that they are likely required to do in their homes, and generally
ensure that the child will be healthy and carried to term.
31
The same clinic often provides both the fertility treatment and the
obstetric care to the surrogate. This creates a potential conflict of interest
for the fertility doctors. 32 In one clinic we interviewed, the doctors' fees
from the intended parents was tied to the successful birth of the child.
33
This incentivizes fertility specialists to prioritize the desire of the in-
tended parents to successful deliver of a healthy child over the health and
well-being of the surrogate (if there were a conflict between the two).
The ICMR provides a form surrogacy agreement where the great
majority of the terms are obligations of the surrogate and also contains an
acknowledgment by the surrogate of the medical procedures that she is
undergoing, but there is no explanation of the risks involved.34 Addition-
ally, the guidelines do not mitigate the conflict of interest among doc-
tors. 35 The two rights enumerated in favor of surrogates in the form
contract are that the intended parent be tested for HIV/AIDS to minimize
the risk of her becoming infected as a result of the embryo transfer and
that the genetic parents are required to take custody of the child even if
he or she has birth defects. 36
Despite the extensive role of fertility specialists in India in the sur-
rogacy process, they are typically not parties to a surrogacy contract. The
contracts are instead between the intended parents and the surrogate. The
contract lawyers are hired by and represent the intended parents, and to
the extent they interact with the surrogates, it is to explain to the surro-
gates their obligations under the contract. 37
In discussing surrogacy, the word "exploitation" is often used, par-
ticularly by opponents of surrogacy. The anti-commodification perspec-
tive holds that selling gestational care is inherently exploitative to the
31 See Interview with Dr. Manju Dagar (Apr. 5, 2017)(New Delhi, India); Interview with
Sarita (Apr. 5, 2017) (New Delhi, India).
32 See Interview with Dr. Manju Dagar (Apr. 5, 2017) (New Delhi, India).
33 See Interview with Surrogacy Agent, Gupta Clinic (Apr. 6, 2017) (noting that com-
pensation is only 50% when surrogate miscarries) (New Delhi, India).
34 See ICMR GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 77-97.
35 Foreign nationals and homosexual couples are not discussed whatsoever within the
ICMR guidelines. The guidelines clearly contemplate that married couples would be the in-
tending parents, but the guidelines explicitly allow single women to undergo ART treatment to
have a child of her own. Moreover, the guidelines do not address the marital status of surro-
gate. See Id. at 1-76; Thus, India was known to be a viable option for basically anyone; the
tightening of regulations in the surrogacy industry since 2012 has led to led to a smaller surro-
gacy market in India and an expanding market elsewhere, such as Nepal. Danielle Preiss &
Pragati Shahi, The Dwindling Options for Surrogacy Abroad, ATLANTIC, May 31, 2016, https:/
/www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/201 6/05/dwindling-options- for-surrogacy-abroad/
484688/.
36 See ICMR GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 92-93.
37 See Interview with Apurva Agarwal (Apr. 5, 2017) (New Delhi, India).
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surrogate. 38 Indeed, strong anti-commodification voices in India argue
that surrogates exercise no real "choice" because they only become sur-
rogates because of their poverty. 39 Some people in India focus on surro-
gacy as an example of the problems of the capitalist system more
broadly. For example, the feminist group All India Democratic Women's
Association (AIDWA), which is the women's wing of the Communist
Party of India (Marxist), believes that compensated surrogacy should be
banned because it exploits surrogates. 40
Some people also view surrogacy as commodification of the child.
A debate also rages on about whether or not surrogacy is the sale of the
child, but often technical arguments are made on both sides of the de-
bate.4 1 When prohibitions on the sale of children were enacted, they did
38 Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Contract Law, Reproductive Technology, and
the Market: Families in the Age of Art, 51 U. Rich. L. Rev. 419, 431-432 (2017) (describing
as "anti-commodification," the view that surrogacy could undermine the dignity of marriage,
"denigrate[ ] the emotional significance of home labor," and "violate the norms of love that are
supposed to govern marital relations" and motherhood).
39 See Bindu Shajan Perappadan, Surrogate mothers appeal to ICMR, seek 'dignity,'
HINDU, Nov. 6, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/surrogate-mothers-
appeal-to-icmr-seek-dignity/article7848219.ece; Express Web Desk, Cabinet approves bill to
prohibit commercial surrogacy, Sushma Swaraj slams celebrities for misusing practice, IN-
DIAN ExPREss, Aug. 25, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/surro-
gacy-bill-2016-sushma-swaraj-slams-celebrities-for-misusing-practice/; Petition of Jayashree
Wad to Supreme Court of India (Nov. 29, 2016) (on file with author).
40 See Indu Agnihotri, Commercial Surrogacy and Assisted Reproductive Technologies:
Some Issues, ALL INDIA DEMOCRATIC WoMEN's Ass'N, Oct. 20, 2008, http://aidwaonline.org/
post/commercial-surrogacy-and-assisted-reproductive-technologies-some-issues; see also
Mohan Rao, Why All Non-Altruistic Surrogacy Should Be Banned, EcoN. & POL. WKLY., May
26, 2012.
41 Framing the argument in contract law terms, one author argues that the surrogacy
contract necessarily involves the sale of the child, because any breach of contract claim would
ask that the child be handed over (specific performance) and not just for monetary damages.
John Tobin, To Prohibit or Permit: What is the (Human) Rights Response to the Practice of
International Commercial Surrogacy?, 63 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 317, 318 (2014); However, this
doesn't necessarily mean that the surrogacy contract involves the sale of a child--even in sales
of unique artwork or other products, courts would grant specific performance and not just
monetary damages. Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforce-
ment, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2337 (1995) ("In cases involving the sale of land, which is gener-
ally regarded as 'unique,' and certain specialized goods, the remedy of specific performance is
routinely awarded").
Often responding in criminal law terms, pro-surrogacy advocates argue that surrogacy
contracts do not involve the sale of a child because in the most common form of surrogacy
today, gestational surrogacy, intended parents are gaining legal custody of the child that is
genetically connected to them. Many courts in the United States grant what are called "pre-
birth orders" that recognize the intended parents are the legal parents and that allow the names
of both intended parents to appear on the birth certificate of the child. Thus, custody of the
child is transferred even prior to birth. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE. § 7962(e) (West 2018) ("An
action to establish the parent-child relationship between the intended parent or parents and the
child as to a child conceived pursuant to an assisted reproduction agreement for gestational
carriers may be filed before the child's birth .... "); On the other hand, anti-surrogacy advo-
cates argue that those who favor surrogacy are wrong because they make technical legal argu-
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not account for surrogacy so arguing within the existing legal framework
may not be useful.42 Jurisdictions who want to legalize surrogacy could
create an exception for surrogacy under existing laws that otherwise pro-
hibit the sale of children. Other authors make dignity-based arguments
against the sale of gestational care.43
I also suggest that the surrogates are exploited in India, but I focus
on the problems surrogates face as they agree to become surrogates and
issues they face during the pregnancy and childbirth. I frame these
problems as procedural and substantive contract issues.
There are numerous procedural problems in the surrogacy contract
formation process. First, some surrogates and agents told us that the con-
tracts signed by the surrogates were not reviewed by anyone providing
legal counsel to the surrogates. 44 Second, many surrogates did not know
ments or create legal fictions (like pre-birth orders) to characterize the transaction as not
involving the sale of a child or arbitrarily drawing the line at conception. See David M. Smo-
lin, Surrogacy as the Sale of Children: Applying Lessons Learned from Adoption to the Regu-
lation of the Surrogacy Industry's Global Marketing of Children, 43 PpP. L. REv. 265,
322-24 (2016).
42 Prohibitions on child sale exist (in part) to prevent people from selling their own chil-
dren out of economic necessity. If we allowed selling and purchasing children, we can imagine
a world where poor people sold one or more of their children to support themselves economi-
cally. I do not think we want a society where people sell children that they intended to raise
because they cannot afford it. They can and should be able to give away their children through
adoption.
43 See, eg., Yasmine Ergas, Babies Without Borders: Human Rights, Human Dignity and
the Regulation of International Commercial Surrogacy, 27 EMORY INT'L L. Rev. 117, 154
(2013); several European countries limit the sale of gestational care on this ground. They
object to commoditizing gestational care, but this argument does not provide any explanation
because it appears to be based on a moral position. I believe any discussion about whether or
not surrogacy harms the dignity of women should consult the surrogates themselves. In the
United States, there is no evidence that most surrogates feel their dignity is harmed by selling
gestational care; rather, they feel they have been able to do something very meaningful. Helena
Ragon6's interviews with twenty-eight American surrogates finds that surrogates feel they
could play a useful role in the lives of others. She states that "women who chose to become
surrogate mothers did so as a way to transcend the limitations of their domestic roles as wives,
mothers, and homemakers while concomitantly attesting to the importance of those roles and
to the satisfaction they derived from them." Helena Ragon6, Chasing the Blood Tie: Surrogate
Mothers, Adoptive Mothers and Fathers, 23 AM. ETNOLOGIST 2, 352, 357 (1996); See also
Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy Con-
tracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 392 (2012).
The surrogates we met in India were also happy to be providing gestational care. One
surrogate we interviewed in India told us, "The thought of giving a child to someone else is
incomparable, there is nothing else that makes me so happy. I also wanted to make money for
my child's future .... I did not consider it to be bad. There is nothing better than what we are
doing." Interview with Shanta and Kanta, April 7, 2017 (Anand, Gujarat). The correct focus of
the dignity-based concerns should be the women who undertake the practice and in both the
United States and India. There is no evidence that women feel that selling gestational care
violates their sense of dignity.
44 Interview with Sharda and Meera, April 3, 2017 (Anand, Gujrat). Even if they were
provided with counsel, there is still a risk that the lawyers will not provide robust
representation.
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the content of their contracts. 45 One surrogate that we interviewed was
unsure about her compensation amount, whether she was receiving any
monthly payments, and how she would receive payment. 46 Another sur-
rogate we spoke with told us that her contract had been in English, not
Hindi, and that she could not read it.47 Finally, several surrogates noted
that the agent physically held all of the contracts and the women did not
have copies.48 Indeed, one of the agents we interviewed showed us a
contract that stated explicitly that the surrogate would not be allowed to
keep a copy. 49
There were also substantive fairness concerns about the actual terms
included in and excluded from the contract. First, the majority of surro-
gates surveyed by the Center for Social Research were promised pay-
ment only for a successful pregnancy and were not compensated for
undergoing medical procedures if no pregnancy resulted. 50 This practice
occurs despite the fact that the ICMR form contract recommends that the
surrogate receive five percent of the total compensation promised at the
time of the embryo transfer.51 Second, only about twenty percent of the
contracts reviewed by the Center for Social Research discussed compen-
sation at all.52 Third, almost none of the contracts addressed whether
medical care would be provided for the surrogate after the birth of the
child.53 Fourth, women did not have a say in how they would deliver the
babies and told us that the prevailing method was Caesarean sections (C-
sections). 54 Finally, if women die during the surrogacy process, there is
no life insurance or other monetary compensation for their family.
Other abusive situations exist in the Indian surrogacy industry. Mul-
tiple surrogates are known to have been implanted with different em-
bryos of the same intended parents, and if more than one surrogate
becomes pregnant, some surrogates are given abortifacients, sometimes
without their knowledge. 55 Those surrogates whose pregnancies are ter-
minated likely receive no compensation at all.56 In addition, may surro-
gates are not provided informed consent-they are not aware of the
45 RANJANA KuMARI, CENTRE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD-ETH1-
CAL OR COMMERCIAL, 63 (2013).
46 Interview with Maichili Devi, in New Delhi, India (Apr. 5, 2017).
47 Id.
48 Interview with Sharda and Meera (April 3, 2017) in Anand Gujrat.
49 Interview with Agent, Surrogacy Home, in Gurgaon, India (Apr. 5, 2017).
50 See KUMARI, supra note 45, at 70.
51 See ICMR GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 84.
52 KuMARI, supra note 45, at 156.
53 See ICMR GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 65.
54 Interview with Sharda and Meera (April 3, 2017) in Anand Gujrat.; Interview with
Shanta and Kanta (April 3, 2017) in Anand Gujrat..
55 In one study, less than 2.9% of those who had undergone abortions had been asked for
their consent. KUMARI, supra note 45, at 61.
56 Id.
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medical procedures they are undergoing or generally informed about the
potential adverse consequences of the medications. 57
In many cases the surrogacy process goes as planned-the embryo
transfer successfully leads to a pregnancy, surrogates give birth, surro-
gates receive compensation and do not face adverse health consequences.
Some medical professionals view themselves as providing a public ser-
vice. 58 They provide post-natal care even when they are not legally obli-
gated to do so, and other doctors provide educational classes to
surrogates that go beyond what is required by the contract. 59 But even in
cases where everything goes as planned, the allocation of risk clearly
reveals the failures in the contractual process.
B. Gestational Care Markets and Regulation in the United States
Feminist writing on surrogacy in the United States was arguably at
its peak during the custody battle between Mary Beth Whitehead, a sur-
rogate mother, and Richard Stem, the intended father, over a child
known as Baby M. Some feminists argued that surrogacy would be one
more way that poor and minority women would be exploited by rich and
Caucasian people, like the fictional world of The Handmaid's Tale.60
That dystopian novel was published in 1985, the year before the New
57 See SAMA-RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN AND HEALTH, BIRTHING A MARKET: A
STUDY ON COMMERCIAL SURROGACY 64 (2012) ("Almost no information was provided to sur-
rogates about the procedures nor about the techniques that they underwent, apparent from the
lack of details and description about the medical procedures that they experienced"); Pinki
Virani, POLITICS OF THE WOMB: THE PERILS OF IVF, SURROGACY AND MODIFIED BABIES
(2016); see also Interview with Anand Grover (Apr. 3, 2017) in New Delhi, India ("Often they
show documents stating that the woman consented. We must ask ourselves if documents are
sufficient to establish informed consent").
58 See SAMA-REsOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN AND HEALTH, BIRTHING A MARKET: A
STUDY ON COMMERCIAL SURROGACY 64 (2012) ("Almost no information was provided to sur-
rogates about the procedures nor about the techniques that they underwent, apparent from the
lack of details and description about the medical procedures that they experienced").
59 See e.g., Dr. Nayana H. Patel, Medical Director of Akanksha Hospital & Research
Institute in Anand, Gujarat, India, http://ivf-surrogate.com/DrNayanaPatel.
60 See, e.g., Gena Corea, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 213-49, 272-82 (1988); Lorillard, supra
note 41, at 250; Mary Lyndon Shanley, "Surrogate Mothering" and Women's Freedom: A
Critique of Contracts for Human Reproduction, 18 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SoC' Y 618,
618 (1993); Martha A. Field, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES
(1988); Janice G. Raymond, WOMEN As WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM (1993); Anita L. Allen, The Socio-Economic Struggle for
Equality: The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 HARv. BLACKLETTER J. 17, 17 (1991); Christine L.
Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or Commodification of Wo-
men's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 163 (1997); New York banned
surrogacy upon the recommendation of an influential commission, the New York Task Force
on Life and the Law, whose report also noted concerns about this. See NEw YORK STATE TASK
FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PUBLIC POLICY 85 (1988).
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Jersey Supreme Court declared the surrogacy contract between Stem and
Whitehead unenforceable. 61
Similarly, other feminist commentators argued that women would
never voluntarily choose to sell gestational care; they would only do so
because of economic desperation. 62 However, these fears have not mate-
rialized. Empirical studies of surrogates do not reveal that they are dis-
proportionately minority or from poorer economic classes. 63 As further
discussed below, this may be, in part, because matching entities exclude
poor women from gestational care markets.
Today most American states have moved away from New Jersey's
prohibitionist approach. The laws relevant to gestational care markets-
tort, contract, and family law-are within the domain of state law. Of the
fifty U.S. states, twenty-four recognize surrogacy contracts by statute or
case law. 64 In New Jersey, the Baby M case still requires courts to invali-
date compensated surrogacy contracts, but contracts where women re-
ceive reasonable living expenses are generally permissible. 65 In New
Jersey and three other states that do not permit compensation for gesta-
tional care, the reasonable living expenses could be inflated to account
for the sale of gestational care. On the other hand, four states specifically
prohibit the enforcement of compensated surrogacy contracts. 66
Eighteen states have no legislation or administrative rules prohibit-
ing or regulating surrogacy. 67 I focus on how surrogates fare in those
gestational care markets since they are the closest analogue to the Indian
regulatory environment (i.e., there is no legislation or administrative
61 Nadine Taub, Surrogacy: Sorting Through the Alternatives, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 285, 288 (1989) ("Given the limited employment, educational and other options available
to many women, it seems almost inevitable that the intended parents will have greater social
and economic resources than the prospective birth mother. This imbalance can only increase as
embryo transfer from one woman to another makes the use of women of color for gestation of
white fetuses more likely").
62 See Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral & International Perspectives on Surrogate Mother-
hood: The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the United States, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 557, 578 (1999); see also Glenda Labadie-Jackson, The Reproductive Rights of La-
tinas and Commercial Surrogacy Contracts - English Translation, 14 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & PoL'Y
49, 61 (2008); Kerian, supra note 60, at 160.
63 Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of
Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. Soc. IssuEs 21, 31 (2005).
64 NEW YORK REPORT 2017 at 35 n.47.
65 See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (N.J. 1988).
66 Arizona and Indiana will not enforce compensated surrogacy contracts or uncompen-
sated surrogacy contracts. See ARiz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2011) (stating that no person
may enter into or assist in creating a surrogacy contract); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2006);
Michigan and New York do not enforce any surrogacy contract and also impose criminal
penalties. MICH. Comap. LAWS §§ 722.855-859 (1988) (making surrogacy contracts void and
unenforceable and criminalizes surrogacy for compensation); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 122
(McKinney 2010).
67 See supra CREATIVE FAmiLY CoNNEcrIONS.
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rules about surrogacy). It should be noted that in some of the American
states that have adopted legislation to legalize surrogacy, the statutes
provide protections to surrogates. For example, legislation in Illinois re-
quires that the surrogate have a health insurance policy that covers the
pregnancy and post-partum period.68
Generally, three sets of actors in the surrogacy process mediate the
relationship between the intended parents and the surrogates-fertility
specialists, matching entities, and surrogacy lawyers. Matching entities
act as intermediaries connecting intended parents to surrogates. 69 How-
ever, surrogates and intended parents also self-match. 70
In the United States, unlike in India, fertility specialists do not typi-
cally recruit surrogates and connect them to intended parents, but rather
provide only fertility treatment. Nevertheless, there is still a potential
conflict of interest given that the intended parents typically pay for fertil-
ity services, but the surrogate is the patient of the fertility specialist.71
The voluntary association of reproductive specialists, the American Soci-
ety of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), has issued clear guidelines that
state that the person undergoing the fertility treatment (i.e., the surrogate)
is considered the patient, even if the intended parents are paying the
bills.72 Notwithstanding these guidelines, however, some surrogacy law-
yers still include express acknowledgements of this potential conflict in
the agreement between the intended parents and the surrogate so that the
surrogate is aware of it. 73
Once a pregnancy occurs, it is nearly always the surrogate who
chooses the obstetrician that will monitor the pregnancy and provide pre-
natal care. 74 Surrogates also typically choose the hospital where the de-
livery occurs. 75 Because the providers of the fertility treatment and pre-
natal care are different and compensation is paid only for medical ser-
vices, the risk for a conflict of interest for medical professionals is lower
68 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 47/20 (2005).
69 Some examples of matching entities: Center for Surrogate Parenting, Inc., http://www
.creatingfamilies.com/; Circle Surrogacy, http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/; Agency for Surro-
gacy Solutions, Inc., https://www.surrogacysolutionsinc.com/.
70 Zsuzsa Berend, The Romance of Surrogacy, 27 Soc. F. 913, 920 (2012) ("Increas-
ingly, there is self-matching between surrogates and [intended parents], and those who choose
an agency are better informed and not infrequently have specific expectations and requests").
71 Traditional surrogacy involves artificial insemination of sperm into the uterus and is
less complicated than gestational surrogacy, but even then fertility specialists are likely to be
involved. E-mail from Bruce Hale, surrogacy lawyer practicing in Massachusetts (Sept. 6,
2017) at 12.52 pm (on file with author).
72 See American Society for Reproductive Medicine & Society for Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology, Recommendations for practices utilizing gestational carriers: an ASRM
Practice Committee guideline, 97 FERTIrrY & STERurrY 1301 (2012).
73 E-mail from Surrogacy Lawyer in Massachusetts (Sept. 6, 2017) (on file with author).
74 Id.
75 Id.
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in the United States than in India. In other words, the obstetrician can
provide pre-natal care for the surrogate without considering the desires or
needs of the intended parents in situations where those interests may con-
flict. For example, when the surrogate's health may be jeopardized by
carrying the pregnancy to term.
Industry standards require that a surrogate be represented by a law-
yer. The code of ethics of the American Academy of Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology Attorneys, a voluntary organization of lawyers, states
that lawyers can undertake legal representation in surrogacy contracts
only when the surrogate has independent legal representation. 76 The
ASRM guidelines on surrogacy also mandate that fertility specialists
work with surrogates only if both the intended parents and surrogates
have legal representation. 77 Finally, the websites of surrogacy matching
agencies also state that the intended parents must pay for a surrogate's
lawyers. 78
Matching entities vet women who want to become surrogates. They
often provide compensation guidelines. 79 One agency that operates in
two unregulated states-Oregon and Colorado-indicates on its website
that intended parents must: (1) provide life insurance if the surrogates do
not have it; (2) give monthly compensation to surrogates; (3) pay surro-
gates a fee at the time of the embryo transfer; (4) pay for a surrogate's
medical and psychological screening; and (5) in some cases, pay for a
surrogate's lost wages, childcare, and housekeeping.80
We do not observe systematic problems in gestational care markets
in the United States. Industry actors have developed customary norms
and standards that provide basic rights and protections to surrogates. In-
dustry standards require intended parents (among other things) to provide
76 American Academy of Adoption Attorney & American Academy of Assistive Repro-
ductive Attorneys, Academy Code of Ethics § 16(a) ("No Fellow may represent any Party in
an ART Matter in which the Surrogate or Donor does not have legal representation, except in
an uncontested Process to Establish Parentage in which no conflict of interest exists or is likely
to arise among the Parties to that proceeding, or except where good faith efforts have been
made to ensure such representation without success").
77 See American Society for Reproductive Medicine & Society for Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology, Recommendations for practices utilizing gestational carriers: a committee
opinion, 107 FERTILITY & STi~n.rrY e3, e6 (2017).
78 See, e.g., Estimated Costs for Gestational Surrogacy with In Vitro Fertilization,
CENTER FOR SURROGATE PARENTING, http://www.creatingfamilies.com/surrogacy/surrogacy-
costs-gestational-surrogacy-in-vitro-fertilization.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
79 See e.g., Surrogacy Fees, INTENDED PARENTS, http://intendedparents.com/Fees.asp
(last visited Sept. 17, 2017); Approximate Timeline of the Surrogacy Process for Surrogates,
ALL THINGS SURROGACY, https://allthingssurrogacy.org/timeline-of-the-surrogacy-process/
(last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
80 Surrogate Compensation Oregon and Colorado, NW SURROGACY CENTER, https://nw-
surrogacycenter.com/pdf/NWSC-Surrogate-Compensation-OR andCO_030117.pdf (last
visited Sept. 17, 2017).
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life insurance to surrogates, to pay for independent legal representation
for surrogates, and to pay increased costs for C-sections or other health
complications. 81
If there were systematic abuse of surrogates, anti-commodification
opponents of surrogacy would likely draw attention to it. The Center for
Bioethics and Culture is one of the most vocal opponents of surrogacy in
the United States, yet it does not provide any information about system-
atic abuse of surrogates. By pointing to the experiences of some women,
they argue that surrogates are harmed when they have to give up the
child. However, psychological studies of surrogates do not support the
argument that surrogates suffer trauma from the separation with the
child.82 The Center also argues that surrogates are paid very little for
their work. According to that organization, taking into account every
hour of the pregnancy, a surrogate is paid about $3.00 per hour of gesta-
tional care. 83 This suggests that the rates set by matching entities for
gestational care may be too low and should be increased, but not neces-
sarily that surrogacy should be banned completely.
I do not mean to suggest that there are no problematic situations in
the gestational care markets in the United States. Pregnancy is inherently
risky. Women have died while working as surrogates. 84 In Oregon, an
agency defrauded intended parents and surrogates of money.85 An Amer-
ican-based surrogacy agent was recently sentenced to jail for defrauding
intended parents. 86
81 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 64, at 15-17.
82 One study of twenty-four surrogates in the United Kingdom found that none had
trouble relinquishing the child and many handed the child over immediately. The author con-
cludes the surrogates showed no evidence of psychopathology. Olga van den Akker, Genetic
and gestational surrogate mothers' experience of surrogacy, 21 J. REPROD. & INFANT
PSYCHOL. 145, 152 (2003); Another recent study that surveyed surrogates ten years after they
gave birth also found that they scored within the normal-range for self-esteem and did not
show signs of depression according the Beck Depression Inventory. None expressed regrets
about surrogacy. V. Jadva, S. Imrie, & S. Golombrok, Surrogate mothers 10 years on: a longi-
tudinal study of psychological well-being and relationships with the parents and child, 30
HUM. REPROD. 373, 376 (2015).
83 Surrogacy, CENTER FOR BioEamics & CULTURE NETWORK, http://www.cbc-network
.org/issues/making-life/surrogacy/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
84 E.g., Mirah Riben, American Surrogate Death: NOT the First, HUFEINGTON POST,
Oct. 15, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.commirah-riben/american-surrogate-death-_b_8298
930.html.
85 See Telephone Interview with Oregon Lawyer, March 2017, Ithaca N.Y. ("Thus now I
make sure there is independent escrow").
86 Surrogacy agency founder gets prison for exploiting desperate parents, FOX 5 SAN
DmEoo, Aug. 7, 2017, http://fox5sandiego.com/2017/08/07/surrogacy-agency-founder-gets-
prison-for-exploiting-desperate-parents/.
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II. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON GESTATIONAL CARE MARKETS
As mentioned above, in India and eighteen U.S. states, a private
contract model free of any legislative or administrative regulation
prevails for the sale and purchase of gestational care. Yet there are sig-
nificantly different customary practices in the gestational care markets in
India and the United States. The customary norms in the United States
are more surrogate-protective than those in India. In this section, I argue
that the legal context of India and the United States helps to explain these
differing outcomes.
First, in the United States (both in unregulated and regulated states),
industry actors, medical doctors, matching entities, and lawyers operate
in an environment where they have good reason to believe that a surro-
gate could sue them for malpractice or sue intended parents to invalidate
the surrogacy contract. American legal practice permits contingent fees,
and as a result tort lawyers may be willing to represent surrogates and
intended parents with no upfront cost to the surrogate. The ability of
surrogates to access courts and the perception of industry actors that sur-
rogates can access courts helps explain why the industry developed sub-
stantively fairer contract terms and a procedurally fairer contract
formation process than exists in India. Time frames for adjudication are
relatively speedy-it takes approximately one year for a lower court to
reach a decision.87 Moreover, voluntary organizations of surrogacy in-
dustry professionals, including surrogacy lawyers and fertility doctors,
have developed surrogate-protective norms and certain ethical standards.
Lawyers and doctors who are part of the industry may be motivated by a
sense of justice and fairness, but are also concerned about their own lia-
bility when they develop standards of care.
Second, industry actors, particularly medical professionals, are con-
cerned not only about the prospect of being sued, but are also worried
about large damages awards. Indeed, American courts are known to
award significant punitive damages. 88 Professor Eisenberg has noted that
the perception about the number of cases and the amount of punitive
damages awarded exceed what actually happens in practice. 89 In addi-
tion, doctors are incentivized to comply with the surrogate-protective
ASRM guidelines since doing so would strengthen their argument that
they have met their standard of care in a tort suit against them. Thus, in
87 Mattia Landoni, Justice Delayed... An Overview of the Options to Speed Up Federal
Justice, 18 J. PuB. & INT'L AFFAms 127, 127 (2007).
88 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, HARV. L. SCH., April
2004, at 1-4 (analyzing 64 punitive damages awards of at least $100 million).
89 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
LEoAL STun. 623, 623 (1997).
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an effort to avoid lawsuits and large tort damages, fertility doctors are
likely to follow industry guidelines and standards.
Lawyers as well as doctors are likely worried about malpractice
lawsuits. According to a lawyer who practices in a state that regulates
surrogacy through legislation, agencies and lawyers take extra precau-
tions when dealing with surrogacies as they are concerned about lawsuits
against themselves. 90 Both agencies and lawyers tend to go beyond their
state's legal requirements for surrogacy contracts and representation.
Similarly, in unregulated states, it is likely that industry actors create
industry norms and standards that are well within the shadow of the com-
mon law.
Third, industry actors in the United States may also create surro-
gate-protective norms because they worry that courts will invalidate un-
fair surrogacy contracts using policing doctrines such as duress and
unconscionability. With the Baby M case looming in the background,
lawyers that represent intended parents and matching agencies will likely
advise their clients not to include extremely unfair contract provisions to
ensure procedural fairness in the process. If a surrogate brings a lawsuit
against the intended parents, a court might invalidate a surrogacy con-
tract altogether if it finds it to be procedurally or substantively unfair.
In India, on the other hand, industry actors do not operate in a simi-
larly litigious environment. While litigation rates are increasing in India
as the economy grows, the per capita litigation rate is still relatively
low.91 First, access to the justice system in India is much more difficult
for poor surrogates. This is, in part, because lawyers in India cannot base
their fees on the outcome of the litigation. The Bar Council of India, the
body that regulates lawyers, prohibits lawyers from taking contingent
fees. 92 This essentially means that poor people who cannot afford law-
yers' fees will never be able to bring a lawsuit. Even if a surrogate were
to sue, the resolution of the case could take so long that defendants
would not have an imminent fear of liability, and lengthy time frames for
90 See Telephone Interview with Delaware Lawyer from Ithaca, N.Y. (Mar. 29, 2017).
91 See Sital Kalantry, Theodore Eisenberg & Nick Robinson, Litigation as a Measure of
Well-Being, 62 DEPAuL L. REv. 247, 248 (2013) ("[M]ore prosperous Indian states have, for
decades, had higher litigation rates than less prosperous states"); Marc Galanter & Jayanth K.
Krishnan, "Bread for the Poor": Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55
HASTINGs L.J. 789, 789-90 n.1 (2004) ("India is among the lowest in the world in per capita
use of civil courts.... Maharashtra, one of India's most industrialized states ... ranked thirty-
second of [ thirty-five jurisdictions with an annual per capita rate of 3.5 filings per 1000
persons").
92 Bar Council of India Rules: Part VI, Chapter II, Section H, Rule 20 ("An advocate
shall not stipulate for a fee contingent on the results of litigation or agree to share the proceeds
thereof").
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adjudication further deter those who would otherwise sue. 93 In an empiri-
cal study of five years of Indian Supreme Court cases, my co-authors and
I found that an average of thirteen years passes from the time a case is
brought in a trial court to the time the Supreme Court issues a judg-
ment.94 For lower court decisions, more than 22.8 percent of all cases
before subordinate courts were more than five years old in 2015. 95
Second, not only are medical professionals not overly concerned
about being sued, they also do not face the possibility of any meaning-
fully large monetary judgment against them if they are sued. Indian
courts historically do not award high punitive damage awards. 96 Any
medical negligence claim must instead be brought to consumer protec-
tion courts pursuant to the consumer protection act.97 In addition, there
is no agency similar to the ASRM among Indian fertility doctors that
promulgates ethical guidelines.98 As discussed above, the guidelines set
by the ICMR, a governmental body, provides little protection for
surrogates.
Third, while both Indian and American common law have policing
doctrines (such as duress and unconscionability) and substantially similar
legal tests for negligence, the lack of access to the courts and lengthy
93 See Rukmini S., 'District courts will take 10 years to clear cases,' HINDU, Sept. 27,
2015, http://www.thehindu.com/data/district-courts-will-take- 10-years-to-clear-cases/
article7692850.ece.
94 APARNA CHANDRA, WILLIAM HUBBARD, & SITAL KALANTRY, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF INDIAN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM 2010 TO 2014 (Gerry Rosenberg & Sudhir
Krishnaswamy eds.) (forthcoming).
95 Vrinda Bhandari, India's Criminal Justice System: Example of Justice Delayed, Jus-
tice Denied, FIRSTPOST, http://www.firstpost.comlong-reads/indias-criminal-justice-system-
an-example-of-justice-delayed-justice-denied-3475630.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
96 Punitive Damages: India is behind the curve, LIVEMINT (July 23, 2014, 6:06 PM),
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/rOpy1dDyF7Lxn8Yzr7OEaN/Punitive-damages-India-is-be-
hind-the-curve.html; While high punitive damages awards are rare in India, in one notable
medical negligence case, the plaintiff was awarded $1 million. In that case, the wife of an
American doctor of Indian descent died in India as a result of the Indian doctors' negligence.
Her husband sought and received American-style damage awards from Indian courts. Balram
Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2012) 1 SCC 384 (India); Gayathri Vaidyanathan, A Landmark Turn in
India's Medical Negligence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31. 2013, https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/
2013/10/31/a-landmark-tum-in-indias-medical-negligence-law/? r=0.
97 S. V. Joga Rao, Medical negligence liability under the consumer protection act: A
review of judicial perspective, 25 INDIAN J. UROLOGY 361, 361-63 (2009).
98 One voluntary organization of fertility specialists in India is the Indian Society for
Assisted Reproduction (ISAR). Under ISAR's webpage for medical practitioners, it simply
provides a link to the 2005 ICMR guidelines that provide little protection for surrogates. See
INDIAN SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, http://www.isarindia.net/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2017); A new organization, the Indian Society for Third Party Assisted Reproduction, consist-
ing of doctors who focus on surrogacy, held their first Annual Conference in Mumbai in 2014.
INDIAN SOCIETY FOR THIRD PARTY ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, http://instar.co.in/index.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2017); see also http://instarorg.blogspot.com/.
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judgments in India effectively prevent any such judgments.99 It should be
noted that in the United States, contract and tort law is governed exclu-
sively by states and state courts and there can be significant variation in
doctrine among the states. In India, there is a unitary court system-one
set of courts adjudicate all disputes. Some areas of common law such as
contract law have also been codified by statutes. 100
For all the reasons discussed above, gestational care markets in the
United States operate in a strong shadow of the law created by easier
access for surrogates to courts and relatively faster adjudication time
frames compared to India. The common law rules in whose shadow in-
dustry actors operate include doctrines such as duress, unconscionability,
and public policy that demand that surrogacy contracts and the con-
tracting process be procedurally and substantively fair. Courts and juries
sometimes award eye-popping punitive damage awards, which play a
role in guiding the behavior of industry actors that provide professional
services. Fear of a contract being invalidated, large tort awards, and mal-
practice suits encourage industry actors to self-regulate and ensure that
contracts are procedurally and substantively fair and that surrogates re-
ceive informed consent.
On the other hand, the common law does not cast as wide or long of
a shadow over industry actors in India. Because most surrogates will
never be able to bring a suit against industry actors or intended parents,
industry actors and intended parents are not worried that courts might
invalidate procedurally and substantively unfair contracts or situations.
Lawyers and doctors in the gestational care market are not concerned
about large tort awards assuming a surrogate would be able to sue in the
first place. And even if the suit moved forward, the delay in a final ver-
dict diminishes the significance of the verdict to the injured party.
There have been well-publicized surrogacy cases at the Indian Su-
preme Court, such as the Baby Manji case and the Jan Balaz case. 10 1 But
those cases involved the custody of children whose parentage and citi-
zenship were in legal limbo due to a conflict of laws between India and
the intended parents' country of residence.102 In other cases, intended
parents have sought and received judgments of parentage. 10 3 There are
99 See Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Grappling at the Grassroots: Access to Justice in
India's Lower Tier, 27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 151, 171, 179 (2014); Sital Kalantry, Access to
Justice in India's Lower Courts, INTLAWGRRLS (Jan. 5, 2014), https://ilg2.org/2014/01/05/
access-to-justice-in-indias-lower-courts/.
100 See e.g., Indian Contract Act, 1872, No. 9, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India).
101 Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 2008 SC 6964 (India); Union of
India v. Jan Balaz, AIR 2010 Gujarat 21 (India).
102 Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 2008 SC 6964 (India); Union of
India v. Jan Balaz, AIR 2010 Gujarat 21 (India).
103 Witzleb, supra note 12, at 177.
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no cases that I am aware of where a surrogate sued because of procedural
or substantive contract problems or for medical malpractice. Jayashree
Wad, a senior Indian lawyer, did bring a public-interest litigation on be-
half of surrogates (though no surrogate was consulted nor named as a
plaintiff), asking the Indian Supreme Court to prohibit all gestational
care markets. 104 The goal of her litigation, however, was not to seek
damages for any individual surrogate, but rather to ban surrogacy all to-
gether based on anti-commodification reasoning. 10 5
The "shadow of the law" may not the only explanation for why
unregulated gestational care markets in India have led to systematic
abuses of surrogates. Another plausible explanation is the social context
of India. Notably, surrogates in India are from poorer economic classes
than surrogates in the United States. The vast social inequality in Indian
society, further heightened by caste and economic disparities, probably
also plays a role in creating abusive conditions for surrogates.
But the fact that extremely poor women are allowed to become sur-
rogates in India and not in the United States may itself be due to the
"shadow of the law." In the United States, some matching agencies spe-
cifically exclude women below the federal poverty line. 10 6 Agencies
might prevent poor women from selling gestational care because they are
concerned that courts will view those contracts as exploitative and invali-
date them. American matching agencies may be overcorrecting in re-
sponse to the Baby M case. Even if matching entities started to consider
applications from poor women, intended parents might not select a poor
woman as a surrogate. Women below the federal poverty level may be
perceived to live in an unsafe environment and have worse nutritional
and lifestyle habits than women who are not poor.
However, in India many of the women who provide gestational care
are so poor that they likely eat last in their families, sleep on the floor,
and do strenuous labor, yet they are still recruited to provide gestational
care. 10 7 Recognizing that intended parents may be worried about the
quality of gestational care poor women are able to provide, industry ac-
104 Bhadra Sinha, 'It amounts to sale of motherhood': Surrogacy warrior who moved SC
speaks up, HINDUSTAN TIES, Aug. 26, 2016, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mag
azine-article-led-78-year-old-surrogacy-warrior-to-move-supreme-court/story-Yj6VytkEooOC
hZTVV3KDmK.html.
105 Id.
106 Intended Parents, CENTER FOR SURROGATE PARENTING, http://www.creatingfamilies
.com/intended-parents/ ("We only accept surrogate mothers who are financially independent or
employed, or whose husband or partner is employed. CSP does not accept any applicants for
surrogacy whose income falls below the Federal Poverty Level guidelines") (last visited Oct.
28. 2017).
107 Interview with Dr Gupta, Gupta Clinic (Apr 6, 2017) in New Delhi, India.
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tors require surrogates to live in homes where doctors can ensure that
they are eating enough, taking vitamins, and not exerting themselves. 10 8
On the other hand, in the United States there are no such surrogacy
homes. Industry actors in the United States would worry about the liabil-
ity that they would face by running such homes. Indeed, one lawyer goes
so far as to advise intended parents not to demand too many restrictions
on a surrogate's lifestyle for fear that the surrogate might be considered
an employee of the intended parent. Thus, the fact that poor women do
not become surrogates in the United States is related to the shadow of the
law (they are excluded by matching entities in an effort to avoid "ex-
ploitation"). The lack of shadow of the common law in India allows in-
dustry actors to create surrogacy homes thereby including poor women in
gestational care markets.
Many commentators and policymakers in India have argued that the
abusive conditions faced by surrogates are the reason gestational care
markets should be banned.10 9 However, through a comparative study of
gestational care markets in India and the United States, I argue that the
abusive conditions occur because Indian industry actors do not generally
operate under the shadow of the common law. Given this, the Indian
government should enact legislation that provides protections to
surrogates.
In the next section, I discuss the panoply of regulatory tools availa-
ble to ensure that the terms of the sale of gestational care are procedur-
ally and substantively fair to the sellers of gestational care. I propose
consumer protection laws as an appropriate framework from which to
understand contracts for the sale of gestational care.
III. LEGALIZING AND REGULATING GESTATIONAL CARE MARKETS
Discussions about surrogacy often focus only on whether or not it
should be prohibited. Thereafter, without resolution, the discussion ends.
In Part II, I argue that surrogates face numerous procedural and substan-
tive fairness concerns in surrogacy contracts in India. But this is not a
reason to ban surrogacy-it is a reason to regulate it.
108 Witzleb, supra note 12, at 172.
109 Commentators have also argued that surrogacy harms children and psychological
harms women who have to separate from the children they gave birth to. See, e.g., Matthew
Tieu, Oh Baby Baby: The Problem of Surrogacy, 19 BIOETHICS REs. NoTEs 1, 9 (2007)
("[S]urrogacy ignores the fact that foetal/early infant development is a critical determinant of a
child's welfare, whereby the biological and psychological bond between the surrogate and her
child is of crucial significance for this development"); Many empirical studies have not found
that separation harms the child. See, e.g., Susan Golombok, Families Created Through Surro-
gacy: Mother-child Relationships and Children's Psychological Adjustment at Age 7, 47 DE-
VELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1579, 1579 (2011) ("No differences were found for maternal
negativity, maternal positivity, or child adjustment").
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Actors in the unregulated gestational care markets in the United
States have developed customary norms that provide a basic level of pro-
tections to surrogates, whereas unregulated gestational markets have
failed to provide similar protections in India. But this is not a reason to
dispense with the contract law framework completely. Contract law
presents a spectrum of possibilities: from full freedom of contract to a
heavily regulated model like consumer contracts. Where in the spectrum,
a jurisdiction decides to place its mark will depend (in part) on the
strength of the shadow of common law rules. Below, I discuss the con-
tract law spectrum and argue that regulations adopted to rectify inequities
in consumer contracts and the consumer contracting process should be
(and are already) used by some jurisdictions to regulate surrogacy
contracts.
Libertarians contend that the state should not interfere with pri-
vately negotiated agreements even in the context of surrogacy. Richard
Epstein, for example, argues for full enforcement of surrogacy contracts
without any limitations." 0 He would allow intended parents to prevent
surrogates from terminating the pregnancy." I He argues that the terms of
surrogacy contracts should be based on market factors. 112 Judge Posner
justifies freedom of contract in surrogacy contracts on efficiency
grounds. To Judge Posner, surrogacy contracts are win-win situations-
intended parents receive gestational care and a child, and a surrogate gets
money. 113
Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller's more pragmatic "choice the-
ory" approach would allow for greater regulation of surrogacy con-
tracts. 114 They suggest that regulation in certain cases can actually
enhance autonomy. Most relevant for surrogacy are relational inter-
ests. 115 Dagan and Heller are conscious that too much freedom can lead
to unconscionable contracts and unfair bargaining.' 16 Thus, the state can
intervene to regulate contracts when relational inequities exist.
In gestational care markets, relational inequalities are possible be-
tween the intended parents, fertility specialists, and matching agencies,
110 Epstein, supra note 41, at 2308-09.
111 Epstein, supra note 41, at 2336 ("[I[t cannot be regarded as unjust or unwise that his
decision should determine whether the abortion should take place").
112 Epstein, supra note 41, at 2306-07.
113 Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood, 5 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21, 22 (1989) ("The case for allowing people
to make legally enforceable contracts of surrogate motherhood is straightforward. Such con-
tracts would not be made unless the parties to them believed that surrogacy would be mutually
beneficial").
114 HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS Xi-Xiii
(2017).
115 Id. at 59.
116 Id. at 77-78.
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on the one hand, and women who are surrogates, on the other. When
courts are not accessible or court action takes too long, legislation is
needed to set out minimum level of protections for surrogates. In India,
industry actors are operating outside the shadow of the common law, and
do not fear any negative consequences for failing to rectify procedural
and substantive contracting concerns nor do they generally worry about
tort litigation against them.
I suggest that state regulatory approaches to consumer contracts are
relevant models for jurisdictions to consider when developing regulations
for gestational care markets. A consumer contract typically involves the
sale of services or goods by a large business to individual consumers.
Consumers have no ability to negotiate terms of the contract. 117 Every-
one knows that most consumers sign boilerplate contracts without read-
ing them, but American courts generally bind consumers to those terms
anyway. 118 Sometimes policing doctrines can be used in egregious cases
to invalidate the contracts, but consumers have a collective action prob-
lem and the most aggrieved consumers probably do not even approach
courts.
In the Indian context, there are many similarities between surrogacy
contracts and consumer contracts. There is great inequality in bargaining
power between the parties. In addition, many surrogates do not read or
understand their contracts, they have no legal representation, and they are
given form contracts with little ability to negotiate any terms. Even in the
United States, the intended parents' lawyer typically creates the first
draft of the contract. This gives them significant advantages. While in-
dustry standards require that a surrogate be provided with legal represen-
tation, often there is a cap on how much the intended parents are required
to pay for that legal representation. Consequently, a first-time surrogate
may not have the same information and knowledge as intended parents.
Surrogacy contracts are different from consumer contracts in several
important ways. In surrogacy contracts, unlike consumer contracts, the
vulnerable party is the provider of the services rather than the service
recipient. Surrogacy contracts are between individuals, unlike consumer
contracts, which are between businesses and individuals. Yet bargaining
power asymmetries still exist in surrogacy contracts. Fertility specialists,
matching agencies, and surrogacy lawyers have a vested interest in pro-
moting surrogacy. Agencies play a strong role in setting contract terms
and mediating the relationship between the surrogates and intended
parents.
117 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract
Law, 66 STAN. L. REv. 545, 545-46 (2014).
118 Id. at 548-49.
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There are similar concerns in the consumer contracting and in the
surrogacy contracting process (particularly in India). Consequently, pro-
posals for reforming consumer contracting to address concerns raised in
that context can be useful in rectifying similar problems in the surrogacy
contracting process. Indeed, those jurisdictions that have adopted legisla-
tion to regulate surrogacy have already incorporated many of the propos-
als that scholars have suggested to reform the consumer contracting
process.
While there is no universal agreement among scholars about the
correct approach to regulating consumer contracts, I outline some impor-
tant proposals. First, Professors Hillman and O'Rourke suggest increased
disclosure as a way to address the problems they see with consumer con-
tracts. 119 The ALI's Principles of the Law of Software Contracts also
suggests that increased disclosure requirements would benefit consum-
ers.120 Hillman and O'Rourke argue that even if consumers do not read
the new disclosed terms, non-profit consumer advocacy organizations
may read and flag them for consumers. 121 Similarly, jurisdictions could
require that the potential adverse consequences of the medications and
medical procedures surrogates will undergo be disclosed in writing or
published.
A second approach involves creating a list of presumptively unen-
forceable terms. The European Union has adopted this approach in their
Directive on Unfair Terms, which creates a non-exhaustive list of unen-
forceable terms. 122 A similar list could be useful in the surrogacy con-
tract context to prevent unfair terms against surrogates. For example, the
proposed New York bill to legalize surrogacy invalidates surrogacy con-
tract provisions that prevent a woman from terminating her pregnancy. 123
A third approach to consumer protection involves the use of
mandatory rules. Margaret Radin proposes mandatory rules for all rights
essential to consumer protection. 124 Some jurisdictions already have
adopted mandatory rules in surrogacy contracts. California requires that a
contract contains the means to cover the surrogate's financial expenses,
either by the intended parents or the surrogate's own health insurance. 125
119 Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O'Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licens-
ing, 78 U. Cm. L. REv. 95, 103-04 (2011).
120 Id. at 103-09.
121 Id.
122 Council Directive 93/13, art. 3(3) Annex, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EU).
123 Child-Parent Security Act, A-6959A, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. § 581-401 (N.Y. 2017).
124 Margaret Jane Radin, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS AND THE
RULE OF LAW 213 (2013) ("[M]y preliminary suggestion is that a purported contract contain-
ing offending boilerplate should be declared invalid in toto, and recipients should instead be
governed by the background legal default rules").
125 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)(4) (West 2018) (the statute also requires that the contract
contain: (i) the date on which the assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers was
20181
712 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 27:685
Delaware further requires that consideration must be "reasonable" and
that funds must be placed in escrow before an embryo transfer occurs.
126
Along the lines of mandatory rules, one author suggests that, like in an
adoption setting where parents have the right to change their minds, sur-
rogates should have the unilateral right to terminate the contract within a
limited window of time and keep the baby. 127 Another possible
mandatory rule a jurisdiction could enact is to require intended parents
pay for independent legal representation for a surrogate.
A fourth approach would be to require pre-approval of individual
contracts. Israel has adopted this method for surrogacy contracts. 1
28 Sim-
ilarly, South Africa, which permits only uncompensated surrogacy, re-
quires surrogacy agreements to be confirmed by the High Court in the
jurisdiction the intended parents are domiciled. 129 No surrogacy can take
place without the court confirming the agreement or after the lapse of
eighteen months from confirmation. 130 The surrogacy bill proposed in
India also creates a regulatory body to monitor all surrogacy arrange-
ments.131 One of the alternatives proposed in the American Bar Associa-
tion's model surrogacy act requires each surrogacy contract to be
approved by a court. 132 Another model statute created by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also proposed a
similar solution in its prior version, but the more recent version suggests
that contract validation is required only for genetic surrogacy and not for
gestational surrogacy. 133 The risk with such an approach is that the body
that pre-approves contracts may not have the competence to do so or may
simply "rubber-stamp" the contract. This level of state involvement may
also be unnecessary in contexts where courts are accessible and the com-
mon law protects surrogates.
A fifth approach, like that of the American Consumer Protection
Bureau, is to create an agency that takes consumer complaints and
promulgates regulations to enhance consumer protections. This may be
executed; (ii) the persons from which the gametes originated, unless donated gametes were
used; and (iii) the identity of the intended parent or parents).
126 79 Del. Laws tit. 13, ch. 8 § 8-807(d)(3) (2013) ("The agreement of the intended
parent or parents to pay the gestational carrier reasonable compensation").
127 Smolin, supra note 41, at 339.
128 Embryo Carrying Agreements Law (Approval of the Agreement and the Status of the
Child), 5756-1996, SH No. 1577 (Isr.).
129 Children's Act 38 of 2005; Exparte WH 2011 (6) SA 514 at para. 31 (GNP) (S. Aft.).
130 Children's Act 38 of 2005; Exparte WH 2011 (6) SA 514 at para. 31 (GNP) (S. Afr.).
131 The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill (India 2016), available at http://164.100.47.4/Bill-
sTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/257-LS-2016_Eng.pdf.
132 American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology,
2008 AM. BAR Assoc. SEC. FAM. L. CoMMirTEE REPROD. & GENETIC TECH. 1.
133 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, § 813, cmt., (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2017), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/UPA 2017 Final_
2017sep22.pdf.
REGULATING MARKETS FOR GESTATIONAL CARE
particularly valuable for gestational care markets if regulations include
key players in the industry that are not party to the contract, such as
agents and fertility specialists. The agency could ensure that fertility spe-
cialists give surrogates enough information to ensure that their consent is
truly informed. The costs of operating the agency could be paid through
a tax on the profits of industry actors.
Another approach to regulating surrogacy contracts is a labor law
model. Anthropologist Amrita Pande describes transnational surrogacy in
India as factory work in the Global South. 134 Like the maquiladora fac-
tory workers in Mexico, surrogates in India labor for people in the
Global North. In line with this framing, legal scholar Cyra Choudhury
proposes a labor law model. 135 Even though transnational surrogacy has
ended in India for the moment at least, the labor analogy is still
relevant. 136
Indeed, surrogacy contracts are similar to employment contracts. In
surrogacy contracts, like employment contracts, the vulnerable party is
typically the provider of services and the one in need of protection. As
Choudhury observed, "the state can intervene to equalize some of the
bargaining disparities ... through worker rights and mandatory contrac-
tual requirements."' 37 A labor model is also useful because it allows ju-
risdictions to regulate industry actors that would not otherwise be
covered by contract-law regulations. Regulating only the contractual re-
lationship (which exists between the surrogate and the intended parents)
will not hold matching entities and fertility specialists accountable. Juris-
dictions should consider enacting regulations to directly address their be-
havior to ensure that they act in ways that are fair to surrogates.
In sum, the types of regulations used to address inequities in con-
sumer contracts can be useful tools to mitigate the abuses surrogates face
in unregulated gestational care markets. The proposals above are not ex-
clusive options and jurisdictions can "mix and match" among the sugges-
tions. Countries are best suited to determine what level and type of
regulation is most suitable in their circumstances. Where the common
law does not create a long and wide shadow over the industry actors,
unregulated surrogacy markets have not led to surrogate-protective in-
dustry norms. Thus, in India, a model that heavily regulates the contract
and the actors who are not party to the contracts is necessary to better
protect surrogates.
134 AMRITA PANDE, WOMBS IN LABOR: TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY IN IN-
DIA (2014).
135 Cyra Akila Choudhury, The Political Economy and Legal Regulation of Transnational
Commercial Surrogate Labor, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2 (2015).
136 Id. at 22.
137 Id. at 62.
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CONCLUSION
Many newly emerging surrogacy markets imported the American-
style free market model to surrogacy, but this model has led to exploita-
tion and abuse of surrogates even though similar abuses were not ob-
served in the United States. It is interesting that even in U.S. states
where there is no legislation that directly regulates surrogacy, industry
actors have developed customary terms and norms that provide a basic
level of rights and protections to surrogates. However, industry norms do
not similarly protect surrogates in India.
I argue that industry actors in the United States are incentivized to
create such protective norms because they have legitimate concerns that
courts might invalidate contracts using policing doctrines or that surro-
gates will bring malpractice suits against them for large damage awards.
Doctors, lawyers, intended parents, and matching entities operate in the
shadow of the common law in the United States. On the other hand,
surrogates in India generally lack access to courts, judgments take long
periods of time, and large tort awards are less common. Thus, the com-
mon law rules that would otherwise protect them do not serve to force
industry actors to self-regulate.
Rather than simply importing the free contract model that prevails
in many states in the United States, in countries like India where the
shadow of the common law is weak, governments should enact legisla-
tion that creates protections for surrogates. These protections could in-
clude requiring intended parents to pay for life insurance, post-natal care,
and independent legal representation for surrogates. In addition, surro-
gates should be provided with better disclosure of the consequences of
the medical procedures they will undergo. In developing regulations for
gestational care markets, India and other jurisdictions can borrow from
tools suggested to address inequalities in the consumer contracting pro-
cess. For example, Indian legislation might invalidate certain provisions
in surrogacy contracts or require that mandatory provisions be included
in such contracts to protect surrogates.
Where a regulatory regime lands on the contract-freedom spectrum
should turn on an evaluation of the circumstances of the country. 138 In
138 Those familiar with law and policy in India will respond to my proposal by arguing
that even if India were to adopt state-of-the art legislation to protect all the vulnerable parties
in a surrogacy arrangement, surrogacy law would be flouted just like many other laws in India.
But just because some laws are ignored by people in India does not mean that appropriate laws
should not be crafted or adopted. In the context of women's rights, laws that are regularly
violated are laws that attempt to change private behavior such as anti-dowry law. On the other
hand, laws regulating surrogacy involve more public transactions between medical profession-
als, intended parents, and an unrelated third party (the surrogacy). This makes it more difficult
to hide than private transactions as well as other medical transactions (such as sex determina-
tion). Finally, surrogacy industry actors would be motivated to comply with legislation that
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countries where the common law rules are structured such that they give
adequate bargaining power to surrogates and where courts are accessible
to surrogates, the circumstances are ripe for a surrogacy industry to de-
velop surrogate-protective norms without any legislative intervention.
On the other hand, countries, where the common law rules do not cast a
shadow over the bargaining process, countries should enact legislation
that guarantees minimum protections to surrogates.
regulates the industry. Fertility doctors are likely to follow legal regulations as they would still
make significant profits even with increased regulation. Intended parents want to ensure par-
entage rights and thus would be motivated to follow legal rules. Finally, the medical proce-
dures involved in surrogacy require some degree of knowledge, technology, and lab facilities,
which makes it difficult for people who are not experts to engage in it. While illegal practices
may exist even if surrogacy is legalized and regulated, they will also exist if there was a full
prohibition on surrogacy.
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